The Fallujah Question

In 1944 Allied forces were advancing upon the heartland of Nazi Germany. On June 6, 1944, the Allies made the incredibly ambitious landing on the French coast – D-Day. By August 25, 1944, Paris was liberated. By the end of August, the Allies had advanced all the way to the River Meuse. When German Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt was asked by headquarters what should be done to stem the advance he wired back “Make peace you fools! What else can you do?”

Then, the advance stopped.

Despite the fact that both Generals Patton and Montgomery wished to make a spearhead advance to Berlin, Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower opted to create a “broad front” strategy, slowly advancing as a wall towards Berlin. This strategy did produce victory, but at a high cost. Patton and Montgomery’s plan would have avoided much of the carnage by immediately cutting off the head of the Nazi regime by isolating Berlin and preventing the Nazi headquarters from issuing further orders. It may well have been that the remaining German forces isolated between the front and rear sections of the allied forces would have simply given up rather than fight for a lost cause. It could have prevented the horrors of the Soviet advance and forever changed the outcome of the Cold War that was to follow.

Eisenhower himself deeply regretted the loss of life incurred in the autumn of 1944 to the fall of the Third Reich in April of 1945. Historians have rarely questioned Eisenhower’s tactics, although it would have been likely that the rapid advance on Berlin was feasible. The outcome of World War II at that point was inevitable – Germany would fall. The question was how many would have to die before that conclusion would come to pass.

The US military now faces a similar situation in Iraq. Our initial advance was as rapid as the advance in the late summer of 1944. We did what Eisenhower did not; we rushed into the enemy capital in a blitzkrieg attack, isolated it, and left the opposing army unable to fight. Despite the terrorism in Iraq, the defeat of the insurgency is inevitable. The question is how many have to die in order to see it through. I’ve been contemplating the situation in Fallujah, and while there are those who believe the current strategy in Fallujah is a wise one, there seems to be precious little that supports such a strategy.

The first is the way in which the terrorists are reacting to the news. They don’t seem worried at all – at least on the surface. Much of asymmetrical warfare is based in psychology – terrorism thrives on the idea that a group of terrorists can outmaneuver a much larger force. We’ve unintentionally fed that idea with our pullback. That makes the situation inherently more dangerous. We have to project the aura that terrorism is a one-way ticket to death, and we’re failing on that effect at this point. Now, granted, if we suddenly do something to crush the rebellion no one will remember those who went to the streets in premature celebration. However, if we don’t, we’ll have added fuel to the fire of terrorism and endangered more lives both coalition and Iraqi.

The second is the seemingly ad hoc way in which this effort is being carried out. We put a former Ba’athist general in charge of a force, and now we’re trying to push him out. We need to show that we mean business, yet it seems that we’re giving up a significant part of the job in Fallujah to an untested and somewhat mysterious force. What if just a few bad apples let the fighters trickle out of the city? We’ll have let an opportunity to crush the terrorists pass and allowed them to return to plotting attacks against Americans. There is a high amount of risk involved in this decision, and I’m less than convinced that it will pay off as it has been presented.

On the other hand, Belmont Club makes the argument that this strategy is an effective one as it doesn’t cede the critical duty of keeping the terrorists boxed up and prevents the militants from destroying the town and killing civilians en masse. He also argues that the "negotiations" are little more than a feint that allows time for all the pieces to moved into the right position. Finally, he also notes that recent movements suggest a tactical repositioning of elements in preparation for a strike against the terrorists.

In all honesty, I hope Wretchard is right on this. I hope that indeed what has happened is a tactical move designed to keep the terrorists boxed in while the Marines get ready to strike. If my initial pessimism is incorrect, I’ll be more than happy to take my share of crow.

However, if not, we’ve made a major mistake. We’ve fed into the insurgency by reinforcing the idea that resistance against the coalition will cause us to pull back. The way to win against terrorism is not to flinch, but to fight back and make it very clear that terrorism will not work. Right now it doesn’t seem as though we’re doing nearly as well on that front as we ought.