Milton Friedman’s Century

Today would have been the 100th birthday of Milton Friedman, the economist and author who helped inspire some of the most important economic policies of our time and helped millions of people escape poverty. Friedman doesn’t get much recognition outside of economic circles, but his achievements in that field were more than just writing a few textbooks. He helped change the face of the American economy for the better.

When Milton Friedman won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976, the world was enamored with the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, who taught that government spending would somehow produce a “mulitplier effect” that would lead to economic growth. The theory was that if the government were to spend $1 it would produce more than $1 in economic activity. In the 1960s, Friedman famously wrote that “we’re all Keynesians now”—a position later adopted by Richard Nixon in 1971.

In the 1950s through the 1970s, one could credibly think that the future lay not with free markets but with centrally-planned economies. Keynesianism was the dominant theory in economics and government policy. Governments across the globe were expanding the reach of central planning in a whole host of economic sectors. The ideas of the Austrian Economic School were dismissed as crackpot theories.

But then, the crash hit.

Friedman’s Revolution

In the 1970s, the world economy entered into a massive downslide. The Arab oil embargo pushed gas prices through the roof. But more critically, something happened that Keynesian theory said was impossible: stagflation – high inflation and economic recession. Conventional Keynesian theory taught that inflation and economic recession were opposites and could not happen at the same time. Yet in the 1970s, that is precisely what happened.

Across the globe, politicians tried the conventional Keynesian remedies. In the United States, Richard Nixon instituted wage and price controls to try to stop inflation, an effort that appeared to work at first until it led to massive shortages of goods. Governments tried to spend their way out of the recession, to little forward growth. The world economy was hanging by a thread, and the conventional economic theories were not helping the world pull out of its economic recession.

But it was Milton Friedman that popularized the way out of the mess. Friedman had already chipped away at the intellectual foundations of Keynesianism. He observed that Keynesian spending and the Keynesian multiplier did not work in practice—once the spigots were turned off, a fiscal hangover resulted. Because there was no new production happening to support all the extra spending, the result of Keynesian stimulus was inflation and recession. Governments wanted to try to inflate their way out of the borrowing costs of all the extra spending, which only made things worse. Further, government “investment” was taking place at the expense of private investment that would produce long-term growth.

Friedman’s theories were right, and his work led him to receive the Nobel Prize in 1976. It was not until the end of the 1970s into the early 1980s that leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher embraced his ideas that the world economy truly began to recover.

Free To Choose

But Friedman was more than just a theoretical economist. He was a gifted philosopher and writer as well, and his work on why free markets are so important to a free society is some of his most important work. His first major popular work, Capitalism and Freedom went into the details of why the economic theory of capitalism was so deeply entwined with having a free society. When it was first published, Capitalism and Freedom was a revolutionary work: Friedman advocated such bizarre notions as a “negative income tax,” an all-volunteer military, and school vouchers.

Friedman continued to popularize his pro-free market ideas in the press, writing columns for Newsweek and other publications. But it was in 1980 when Friedman published one of his most accessible works, Free to Choose, that Friedman’s ideas started truly influencing the popular conversation.

Friedman dedicated himself to pursuing advocacy for free markets and limited government, and he did it with a sense of clarity and purpose. He was able to explain why even the most well-intentioned government programs are thwarted by the complexity of a modern economy. The following clip from the Donohue show in the 1980s shows Friedman at his best:

Friedman, of course, had the better argument, and was able to not only write about economics, but to get millions of people to look at economics in a new way. Instead of viewing economics as the “dismal science,” concerned with the shuffling of abstract value, Friedman popularly imbued economics with a moral aspect. Economics was about maximizing the freedom of the individual rather than the collective or the State. It was about ensuring that individuals were best able to pursue their own ends, provide for their own families, grow their own businesses, and prosper. This shift seems common-sense to us now, and that is due in large part to the influence of Milton Friedman.

A Legacy of Freedom

Today, some of the revolutionary ideas in Capitalism and Freedom are a common part of our day-to-day lives. Milton Friedman pushed for an all-volunteer military prior to the Vietnam War, and today the military is and will remain an all-volunteer force. Friedman’s idea of a “negative income tax” blossomed into the Earned Income Tax Credit, a system where people in poverty who choose to work are rewarded for their efforts with a payment from the government. Instead of welfare, which subsidizes poverty, the EITC encourages work and employment. In 2010 alone, the EITC was responsible for lifting an estimated 5.4 million Americans out of poverty. Friedman’s ideas have lifted 200 million people from poverty into prosperity, an achievement that will stand the test of time.

Now, more than ever, we need leaders who will carry Friedman’s mantle of freedom. Keynesianism, discredited in the 1970s and later by the Japanese “lost decade” in the 1990s is making a resurgence. It isn’t that Keynesian theories suddenly work better than they did in the past, it is that governments are using Keynesianism as a rationale for consolidating political power and justifying more and more control over the world economy. Friedman would have seen right through these efforts.

Just as it was in the 1970s, what the world needs now is not more central State planning, but more economic freedom. The solution to our economic problems is to unleash the creative energies of our people and to get government out of the way of economic growth. Friedman understood this from both a philosophical and a practical viewpoint. Friedman was right back then, and he is right today. And if we listed to his wise counsel again, our economy can come roaring back once again. Milton Friedman’s legacy of freedom can bring millions more from poverty to prosperity again if we are only willing to listen.

Why The Economy Sucks

The news on the economy continues to be bleak—while unemployment is down from nearly hitting double digits, it’s still stuck well above the historical average. GDP growth continues to be sluggish. Businesses are skittish about hiring, which only adds to the troubles. Despite the yearly promises from the Obama Administration about a “recovery summer” (this year’s theme: “third time’s the charm, right?”) this summer is not looking to have much more economic growth than past summers. To put it succinctly: this economy blows.

But why? What is it that’s keeping the economy in the doldrums?

President Obama has his answer: it’s all George W. Bush’s fault. And a plurality of Americans even agree with that. The problem with that theory is Bush hasn’t been President for almost four years and all the things that he did that were supposedly so terrible (Foreign wars! Tax cuts for the rich! Wasteful government spending!) have all been ratified by the Obama Administration.

They’re All Keynesians Now

The other theory popular on the Democratic side and advanced by people like New York Times columnist Paul Krugman is that what we really need is massive government spending – or what economists would call “Keynesian stimulus.”

Keynesianism is named (appropriately enough) for John Maynard Keynes, a British economist and one of the most crucial (if frequently wrong) economic minds of the 20th Century. While Keynesian economic theory is far more advanced than could be explained in a blog post (no less one that anyone would want to read), the sort of “dimestore Keynesianism” that’s popular among today’s Democrats involves the simple theory that government spending produces economic growth.

Here’s how that theory is supposed to work: it posits that the reason why the economy sucks is because of a lack of “aggregate demand.” What that means in more conventional terms is that people aren’t buying enough shiznit. And because people aren’t buying enough shiznit, factories that make said shiznit aren’t running and are laying people off, and the economy is swirling the toilet.

That sounds pretty convincing at first blush – the reason why the economy sucks is because a lack of demand. It’s simple, it’s intuitive, but as I’ll get to later, it’s also wrong.

But first let’s look to what the dimestore Keynesians think is the solution. And they say that if the problem is a lack of aggregate demand, let’s stimulate demand! We take all those unemployed workers and we put them to work on “shovel-ready” jobs. They work for 8 hours a day repairing infrastructure and the government gives them a paycheck for it. Then, they go out and spend that paycheck, which creates demand. Suddenly those people are buying shiznit again, and the shiznit factories are producing their shiznit again, and the economy restarts.

Again, on the surface this all makes sense – it’s a nice and simple description of the problem, it’s a nice and simple solution, and maybe it just might work.

But it doesn’t.

The Economy Is Turning Japanese

In fact, we know that demand stimulus doesn’t work. It’s been tried before. In the 1990s, Japan’s economy took a nosedive after a major financial crisis and a housing bubble. (Sound familiar?) So the Japanese government engaged in a massive orgy of spending. (Sound familiar again?—and I mean the spending part, not the “Japanese orgy” part…) And what was the result? The Japanese economy went into a “lost decade” in which economic growth stagnated.

In 2009, President Obama passed the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act that was supposed to have created thousands of “shovel-ready” jobs and get the economy moving again. Obviously, it didn’t. Instead, unemployment continued to increase at a much higher rate than predicted. Even President Obama was forced to admit that those “shovel-ready jobs” weren’t exactly “shovel ready.” The stimulus didn’t produce the kind of job growth or GDP growth that President Obama promised. But why?

On the surface, Keynesianism makes sense, if you want to get the economy moving, get people jobs and get them to spend money. But once you scratch the surface, it all falls apart. Reason explains why in discussing the Japanese stimulus efforts:

In an attempt to encourage growth, the Japanese embarked on a massive, multi-billion-yen infrastructure program. They built roads, bridges, and airports, all with the goal of creating jobs and reviving the economy. This didn’t work either.

During the 1990s, Japan passed 10 fiscal stimulus packages, focused largely on public works, totaling more than ¥120 trillion ($1.4 trillion in today’s dollars). When one construction plan failed to stimulate economic growth, another was tried. Those plans did not succeed in reviving the economy, but they did saddle the nation with a mountain of IOUs that helped postpone recovery for years. Including “off-budget” borrowing, Japan’s debt was estimated to exceed 200 percent of GDP in 2001.

Construction plans often set job growth targets but rarely focused on project prices. From 1992 to 1999, the Japanese government spent more than $500 billion (in today’s dollars) on public works projects. Yet the construction jobs were not long-term and did not lead to sustained economic growth. Public debt sky-rocketed, unemployment actually doubled from 2.3 percent to 5 percent, and the economy remained stagnant. As Gavan McCormack, a historian at Australian National University, noted in his 1996 book The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, “The construction state is in some respects akin to the military-industrial complex in Cold War America (or the Soviet Union), sucking in the country’s wealth, consuming it inefficiently, growing like a cancer and bequeathing both fiscal crisis and environmental devastation.” The government failed to properly identify which projects should be pursued, ignoring demand signals that the private sector is better at recognizing and responding to.

Taking Keynes To The Woodshed

So we know that Keynesian stimulus didn’t work in Japan and it didn’t work here in 2009. The passage above gives us some reasons why. Stimulus spending doesn’t work because of the way government spends money. Government does not spend money based on an economic calculus, they spend it based on a political calculus. This difference is crucial to understanding why most attempts at government intervention in the economy fails.

In a normal market, goods and services are allocated based on price signals. How does the economy know what to produce and how much of it? It’s all based on prices: when there’s too little of something the price shoots up—suddenly it makes sense to produce more of it. Then when there’s too much, the prices fall again. Supply and demand will, under normal circumstances, find an equilibrium.

The problem with government spending is that it doesn’t follow the rules of supply and demand. If a powerful Senator from South Dakota says that we need a six-lane superhighway between Podunk and East Armpit, that Senator can have the political clout to make it happen. The problem with that is that suddenly the government is spending millions to build a six-lane superhighway that isn’t actually needed and won’t produce economic growth over the long term.

“But wait!,” the Keynesians say, “Doesn’t building that six-lane superhighway to Warehouse 13 mean that workers will be employed and then they’ll have money to spend, creating economic growth?” The answer is yes, you’ll be paying people, but you won’t get economic growth from it. Why? Because the only way the government has money to spend is taxation or borrowing—so for every dollar you spend on that six-lane superhighway, you have to either take a dollar from elsewhere or borrow it and pay it back with interest.

There’s also a phenomenon called “crowding out.” This article explains the “crowding out” effect of stimulus spending in some detail. The short version is that if you take a dollar from the private sector and devote it to public spending, that’s a dollar that the private sector doesn’t have to spend. In other words, the government isn’t doing anything new, it’s just taking spending that the private sector would have done and doing itself. The net economic impact is, to put it in highly technical terms, bupkis. And if you assume that government spending is less efficient than private spending—and you should for the reasons above—the net economic impact is negative.

“But wait!” say the Keynesians again, “What about the infamous Keynesian multiplier?” The Keynesian multiplier is the theory that $1 in government spending produces more than $1 in economic growth. And whenever you hear President Obama argue that the stimulus saved “3 million jobs” and the like, here’s how he arrived at that conclusion. He had the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assume that certain government programs had Keynesian multipliers, and then calculate based on what was spent in stimulus funds. So if you assume that infrastructure spending produces $2 in growth for every $1 spent, magically the stimulus was a fantastic success.

But the Keynesian multiplier is a myth: because of the inefficiencies in government spending and “crowding out,” the assumption that $1 in Keynesian spending produces at least $2 in economic growth is a very bad assumption to make. More rigorous studies have said that the real Keynesian multiplier ranges from zero to just over 1—which supports the idea that stimulus doesn’t produce growth over the long term.

And here is the other problem: when you try to “stimulate demand” in this way, what happens when the stimulus ends? The only thing propping up that artificial demand was government spending—and once the government spending ends, so does the stimulus. The conventional Keynesian theory is that the economy would come back, and once it did the government could retract the stimulus payments. But as Japan found out, that never happens. Stimulus becomes a vicious circle because once the stimulus ends the economy takes a nosedive—which just produces the argument that we need more stimulus to fix it. And indeed, you have Paul Krugman making the argument that we need more stimulus to get the economy moving, and if all else fails maybe we can hope for an alien invasion to get it. Someone has watched Watchmen one too many times.

The Myth Of Austerity

But the dimestore Keynesians have one more argument up their sleeves: they say that lowering government spending certainly won’t work, and will make things worse. They look to Europe, where they argue that the EU’s austerity has caused even more problems for the Eurozone. If Europe has been cutting government spending and Europe is now an economic basketcase, doesn’t that mean that fiscal austerity is a bad idea?

There are two problems with that argument: first, European governments really haven’t slashed spending as Krugman intimates they have. Except for Greece (which had little choice), most European countries have only slowed the rate of spending growth rather than cutting spending. That’s hardly “austerity” any more than only getting a 2% raise is a “pay cut.”

Second, Europe did something else that would depress economic growth—they raised taxes. European countries raised income taxes, their Value Added Taxes (VATs), and taxes on business. And sure enough, raising taxes when businesses and consumers are already feeling the pain of a recession is not a smart idea in the slightest. But the dimestore Keynesians propose doing the same thing: increasing government spending and raising taxes to pay for it. What Europe shows is not that austerity is a bad idea, it’s that government spending and tax increases are. What Krugman is doing is applying exactly the opposite message than what Europe is telling us. And the old saying goes, those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

So, How Do We Fix This Mess?

So far I’ve been painting a pretty bleak picture: we can’t use government spending to get us out of this mess. The preferred Keynesian solution of raising taxes to stimulate aggregate demand won’t work because government spending doesn’t produce lasting economic growth. So, what can we do to get out of this hole?

Ultimately, what we need is to encourage economic growth in the private sector. But that’s not something that can be done with government policy—other than a policy of getting the hell out of the way. Government can offer tax credits for R&D and the like, but even that is an example of government picking winners and losers, which doesn’t have a particularly sterling record.

The most important thing is for the government to get its fiscal house in order. We can’t grow the economy with a huge amount of public debt hanging over our heads. We need to cut spending in real terms, not just slow the rate of increase. We need to pay down our national debt, not add to it. If we want to get more revenue into the hands of the government we need to increase growth rather than taxes. Has this been done before? Yes—and quite successfully. But that is a post for another day…

Krugman’s Fantasy World

Francis Cianfrocca has an interesting critical look at why Paul Krugman’s call for a massive Keynesian stimulus is the wrong policy. His thesis is right: Krugman and many other economists are stuck in a world of rigid mathematical models that have little bearing on the way the world actually works—which is one of the causes of this mess in the first place. Those models keep getting proven wrong, but Krugman’s ideology is blinding him to their faults.

Take Krugman’s belief in the “Keynesian multiplier”. The Keynesian multiplier argues that for every dollar spend in government infrastructure spending, $1.50 in economic growth is realized. If this seems like “voodoo economics” to you, it’s because it largely is. Why sound investments can produce economic multipliers, the chances of the government making those sound investments is rather small.

The Keynesian multiplier might work if government was good at allocating investments in a rational manner. The problem is that government is based on political realities rather than economic ones. So, instead of allocating money on a rational basis (i.e. to where it’s actually needed), Congress allocates money based on the political clout of the campaign contributors. So, there’s no Keynesian multiplier in practice even if all of Krugman’s models say that there should be one: the government’s political mode of allocating resources is not economically efficient, and never will be. As Cianfrocca notes, the real problem is much different:

Let’s note that Krugman is a sober, first-rate economist, but also a woolly-eyed, low-grade political hack. He firmly believes that government is better qualified than private actors to direct the country’s economy, and has advocated a Federal government share of 28% of GDP, compared to the current 22% or so. Since he understands economic efficiency as few do, the conclusion is that he’s committed to the social outcomes that come with government control, as opposed to the free-marketer’s commitment to maximizing utility. But that’s a side point.

But why is the economy performing below capacity in the first place? Many reasons, too many to list here. And why won’t it simply recover on its own, as it has many times in the past? Here things get a bit more interesting. Like many economists, Krugman points to Keynes’s “paradox of thrift”: in uncertain times, ordinary people defer consumption and businesses postpone investments. The economy shrinks below capacity, because of people’s desire to save money.

It’s hard to escape the sense that the best economists and the President of the United States are blaming ordinary people for the economic crisis. If only we’d spend our money instead of save it, we wouldn’t be in such a big mess.

Cianfrocca goes on to argue that the “stimulus” won’t work because people don’t want to spend right now—the intuitively know that they are overleveraged and the country is highly overleveraged, and all this spending is just going to make things worse. Cianfrocca is right on that point.

He’s right because perceptions matter. He correctly points out that all this public indebtedness is exacerbating people’s own personal fears. Only 38% of people believe the stimulus will aid the economy, and that number will drop over time as the stimulus fails to produce any lasting growth. The more consumers feel like the economy is going down the tubes, the less they will spend. The less consumers spend, the fewer businesses will stay afloat, pushing unemployment up and feeding the cycle even more.

That doesn’t even count the pernicious effect of government regulation and liability rules which further decrease business’ willingness to invest and create new jobs. With passage of laws like the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, businesses may now be sued for alleged paycheck discrimination stemming out of events that happened years in the past. This makes every employee a potential timebomb and increases the overall cost of labor. The more Congress kowtows to the unions and enacts “employee-friendly” bills, the more likely it is that jobs will be lost. This spurs Congress to legislate even more to “save jobs” and the cycle continues. The resurgence of union political power could not come at a worse time.

Krugman’s fantasy world in which government rationally allocates money so that it grows the economy has little to do with the realities of our political system. Instead, what Krugman proposes will further erode public confidence in our government. The stimulus bill is an example of Congress giving special breaks to those with the most influence—and those with the most influence tend to be rich special interests rather than small businesses or ordinary citizens. People feel that their government is broken, and they are right.

No matter what the mathematical models predict, psychology is crucial. Krugman’s fantasy is a fantasy because he makes basic and incorrect assumptions about the way the economy functions. His Keynesian spending will not fix the “paradox of thrift” because part of what is fueling people’s unwillingness to spend is the state of government finances. Borrowing trillions more and running up the national debt is not going to make that better, it will make it much, much worse.

A real stimulus would involve the same sort of conditions we regularly impose on other countries in our situation. If we were Argentina, the IMF would be telling us to slash our spending and get our balance sheets in order. That we’re perfectly comfortable telling other countries to go through painful austerity while our government does the opposite sends exactly the wrong message. That isn’t to say government spending is all bad, but the first order of business should be to more rationally allocate the spending we have without adding trillions more in debt.

What is most dangerous about Krugman’s fantasy is that it will never end. The more existing stimulus measures push down the economy, the more Krugman would call for yet more spending. The result would be the same as it always has been: massive hyperinflation due to massive public debt. Krugman’s policies won’t work, and Krugman’s natural response to their failure would be to call for ever more.

We can’t indulge in such fantasies. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and unless we start austerity measures now, the pain is only going to get worse.