Tag: law

“This Nation Will Live To Regret What The Court Has Done Today”

One of the professors at my law school teaches a course on “atrocious cases”—and today he will have something new to add to his syllabus. The Supreme Court handed down a ruling in the case of Boumediene v. Bush that represents one of the most blatant examples of judicial activism of our time. The Supreme Court, or at least five of its Justices, have decided that an alien outside the territory of the United States has the right to the writ of habeas corpus.

Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent (joined by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia) explains why this decision is both overly broad but also unsatisfying to all:

So who has won? Not the detainees. The Court’s analysis leaves them with only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to resolve their particular cases, followed by further litigation before the D. C. Circuit—where they could have started had they invoked the DTA procedure. Not Congress, whose attempt to “determine-through democratic means—how best” to balance the security of the American people with the detainees’ liberty interests, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 636 (2006) (BREYER, J., concurring), has been unceremoniously brushed aside. Not the Great Writ, whose majesty is hardly enhanced by its extension to a jurisdictionally quirky outpost, with no tangible benefit to anyone. Not the rule of law, unless by that is meant the rule of lawyers, who will now arguably have a greater role than military and intelligence officials in shaping policy for alien enemy combatants. And certainly not the American people, who today lose a bit more control over the conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to unelected, politically unaccountable judges.

Justice Scalia’s dissent was blistering—even by his standards:

And today it is not just the military that the Court elbows aside. A mere two Terms ago in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 (2006), when the Court held (quite amazingly) that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had not stripped habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo petitioners’ claims, four Members of today’s five-Justice majority joined an opinion saying the following:

“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority [for trial by military commission] he believes necessary. “Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal
with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means.” Id., at 636 (BREYER, J., concurring).

Turns out they were just kidding.

Indeed they apparently were. Like Lucy pulling the football from Charlie Brown, the Supreme Court has told both the elected branches of government that they call the shots. If there were some strong constitutional logic behind this decision it would be one thing. But the majority opinion even admits that the law is at best murky on the issue of whether a foreigner has ever been granted habeas rights when they are outside the sovereign territory of the United States (and even that contention flies in the face of the weight of authority that decisively holds that they have no access to the writ). Undeterred, the Court chooses to dramatically rewrite settled precedent nonetheless. If prior cases had eviscerated and overruled the key Supreme Court precedent in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), this decision has rendered it a nullity.

The goal of our courts is not to make the law, but to follow the Constitution. This decision is not grounded in the jurisprudence of the Constitution, but of the whims of five. Justice Scalia puts it bluntly, but accurately:

Today the Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes beyond the narrow issue of the reach of the Suspension Clause, invoking judicially brainstormed separation-of-powers principles to establish a manipulable “functional” test for the extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus (and, no doubt, for the extraterritorial reach of other constitutional protections as well). It blatantly misdescribes important precedents, most conspicuously Justice Jackson’s opinion for the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager. It breaks a chain of precedent as old as the common law that prohibits judicial inquiry into detentions of aliens abroad absent statutory authorization. And, most tragically, it sets our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner.

The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.

I certainly hope that it will, but if certain members of the judiciary have their way it will be as a tyranny of the few. Our country is, and should be, a nation of laws, not men. It is sad that we are elevating the whims of five Justices over the will of those who are responsible to the people.

Race And The Justice System

Heather McDonald takes a probing look at whether America’s criminal justice system truly is racially biased. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the objective evidence does not match the conventional narrative:

Backing up this bias claim has been the holy grail of criminology for decades—and the prize remains as elusive as ever. In 1997, criminologists Robert Sampson and Janet Lauritsen reviewed the massive literature on charging and sentencing. They concluded that “large racial differences in criminal offending,” not racism, explained why more blacks were in prison proportionately than whites and for longer terms. A 1987 analysis of Georgia felony convictions, for example, found that blacks frequently received disproportionately lenient punishment. A 1990 study of 11,000 California cases found that slight racial disparities in sentence length resulted from blacks’ prior records and other legally relevant variables. A 1994 Justice Department survey of felony cases from the country’s 75 largest urban areas discovered that blacks actually had a lower chance of prosecution following a felony than whites did and that they were less likely to be found guilty at trial. Following conviction, blacks were more likely to receive prison sentences, however—an outcome that reflected the gravity of their offenses as well as their criminal records.

Another criminologist—easily as liberal as Sampson—reached the same conclusion in 1995: “Racial differences in patterns of offending, not racial bias by police and other officials, are the principal reason that such greater proportions of blacks than whites are arrested, prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned,” Michael Tonry wrote in Malign Neglect. (Tonry did go on to impute malign racial motives to drug enforcement, however.)

There’s no doubt that the incarceration rate in this country is shockingly and troublingly high. However the solution to this problem is not to pretend that it is the fault of the justice system, but to recognize that it comes from a culture of lawlessness. At some point, the crisis becomes self-perpetuating. A culture in which criminal activity is common is likely to be a culture that produces more crime. People live to the norms they see, and when violence, drug use, and crime become endemic, there is more likely to be more crime, violence, and drugs.

The problem with the idea of less vigorous law enforcement is that the ones who are hurt by increases in crime tend also to be disproportionately members of minority groups. Gang-bangers and drug dealers victimize their own communities, not the suburbs. The effects of out-of-control inner-city crime are not helped by efforts to concentrate resources in places where crime is not such an immediate and pressing problem.

What then is the solution? The neglect of America’s inner cities is a travesty made worse by a false sense of noblesse oblige on the part of well-intentioned outsiders. The only lasting solutions will have to come from within. The problem is not who is getting caught, but who are committing the crimes. Trying to solve the wrong set of problems helps no one.

Lawyer Of The Week

Kurt Denke is the owner of a company that makes connection cables for audio/visual equipment. Monster Cable is a company that sells ridiculously-priced connection cables for audio/visual equipment. Monster Cable decided to send a cease-and-desist letter to Mr. Denke’s company.

Monster Cable didn’t realize that Mr. Denke was a lawyer.

This is the response they got to their claim of patent infringement.

Let’s just say that Monster Cable is probably wishing that they’d never sent that letter:

After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1985, I spent nineteen years in litigation practice, with a focus upon federal litigation involving large damages and complex issues. My first seven years were spent primarily on the defense side, where I developed an intense frustration with insurance carriers who would settle meritless claims for nuisance value when the better long-term view would have been to fight against vexatious litigation as a matter of principle. In plaintiffs’ practice, likewise, I was always a strong advocate of standing upon principle and taking cases all the way to judgment, even when substantial offers of settlement were on the table. I am “uncompromising” in the most literal sense of the word. If Monster Cable proceeds with litigation against me I will pursue the same merits-driven approach; I do not compromise with bullies and I would rather spend fifty thousand dollars on defense than give you a dollar of unmerited settlement funds. As for signing a licensing agreement for intellectual property which I have not infringed: that will not happen, under any circumstances, whether it makes economic sense or not.

I say this because my observation has been that Monster Cable typically operates in a hit-and-run fashion. Your client threatens litigation, expecting the victim to panic and plead for mercy; and what follows is a quickie negotiation session that ends with payment and a licensing agreement. Your client then uses this collection of licensing agreements to convince others under similar threat to accede to its demands. Let me be clear about this: there are only two ways for you to get anything out of me. You will either need to (1) convince me that I have infringed, or (2) obtain a final judgment to that effect from a court of competent jurisdiction. It may be that my inability to see the pragmatic value of settling frivolous claims is a deep character flaw, and I am sure a few of the insurance carriers for whom I have done work have seen it that way; but it is how I have done business for the last quarter-century and you are not going to change my mind. If you sue me, the case will go to judgment, and I will hold the court’s attention upon the merits of your claims–or, to speak more precisely, the absence of merit from your claims–from start to finish. Not only am I unintimidated by litigation; I sometimes rather miss it.

Corporate counsel should take note: if you’re going to send a cease-and-desist letter to someone, it’s a good idea to first make sure that you actually have a good-faith case, and second, it’s probably a good idea to make sure that the person you’re threatening isn’t a better lawyer than you are.

(Via Slashdot.)

Gitmo And The Question Of Terrorist Detainees

Jeffrey Toobin has a lengthy examination of Guantánamo Bay and the detention of people caught in Iraq and Afghanistan. The legal battles over the status of detainees continue, as the Supreme Court is set to release the latest opinion concerning detainee rights in Boumediene v. Bush sometime in the next few months.

The real question is what we do when and if Gitmo is closed down. Giving members of al-Qaeda access to US civilian courts does not at all work. A terrorist suspect cannot be given the same rights as a civilian criminal—it’s unworkable to argue that they should have the right to confront their accusers when their accusers might be deep-cover CIA agents actively working against al-Qaeda. There’s a quantitative difference between the sort of evidence used in a criminal trial and the evidence gathered on the battlefield. We certainly don’t want to reduce the standards for civilian trials to the level of evidence gathered on the battlefield—but it doesn’t make any more sense to demand that our armed forces play CSI on the battlefield.

It’s tempting to give these suspects over to their home countries—but if human rights are a serious concern, that would hardly be a good idea. Someone who is deported to a place like Algeria or Saudi Arabia won’t have to worry about waterboarding being torture—instead they’ll likely end up being tortured to death or at the very least treated far worse than they are at Gitmo. For all the hyperbole about Gitmo being “the Gulag of our times” that diminishes the real horrors of the average Third World prison where waterboarding is just the appetizer.

Toobin believes there may be a solution for this problem:

Even if the commissions can somehow begin, the larger question of what to do with the remaining detainees is, for now, unsettled. One response to that quandary is a controversial proposal, by the law professors Neal Katyal and Jack Goldsmith, that is attracting a great deal of attention in the small world of national-security law—and which may offer an electoral lifeline for the Republicans this fall.

Katyal and Goldsmith make unlikely allies. A law professor at Georgetown and former Clinton Administration official, Katyal won widespread renown when he argued and won Salim Hamdan’s case before the Supreme Court in 2006. Goldsmith is a former Bush Administration official who, despite leaving the government in 2004, in part over concerns about civil liberties in the war on terror, remains a strong national-security conservative. (He is now a professor at Harvard Law School.) But the two men shared a conviction that both military commissions and ordinary criminal prosecutions would be impractical for a few of those captured on distant battlefields. Together, they came up with an alternative: a national-security court.

According to their proposal, which was recently the subject of a conference sponsored by American University’s Washington College of Law and the Brookings Institution, sitting federal judges would preside over proceedings in which prosecutors would make the case that a person should be detained. There would be trials of sorts, and detainees would have lawyers, but they would have fewer rights than in a criminal case. Hearsay evidence may be admissible—so government agents could testify about what informants told them—and there would be no requirement for Miranda warnings before interrogations. Some proceedings would be closed to the public. “It’s a new system that’s needed only in extreme circumstances,” Katyal said. “It’s not a default option.”

Not surprisingly, civil libertarians do not like the idea. The problem is that their preferred solution of going through civilian courts simply does not work. Terrorism is not a crime, nor is it like ordinary warfare. Rather it is something that is sui generis, a category all to itself. Treating terrorism like a crime does not work, nor are terrorists properly “combatants” as defined by the Geneva Conventions. (The term “unlawful combatant” is not a term invented by Bush Administration lawyers but one that is inherent in international law.) The laws of war allow us to keep these people off the battlefield for as long as there are active hostilities—which in this war is not a definite term.

The overheated rhetoric from the civil liberties groups doesn’t help. Gitmo is not a “gulag” nor is it some legal black hole. We as Americans face a difficult problem that requires creative thinking—and instead we have the Gitmo issue being used as a political talking point. If we close Gitmo, we had better have a viable solution for what we’ll do with the people being held there. Trying them in civilian courts is not a viable option, nor does it seem likely that the Supreme Court will allow for the current system. At some point, there will need to be a compromise, but that will require all sides to work together rather than merely pointing fingers at each other.

The Law Of Unintended Consequences Strikes Again

A study has found that smoking bans contribute to an increase in drunk driving as smokers either go to bars where smoking is allowed, or go home earlier than they otherwise would.

The First Law of Public Policy strikes again—every public policy has a set of unintended negative consequences and the magnitude of those consequences are in proportion to the sweep of the policy. The smoking ban is no different—instead of letting bar owners, patrons, and workers decide for themselves based on all the available information, the government decided to make the choice for them.

There’s no question that smoking is incredibly bad for you, and second-hand smoke is dangerous. At the same time, the government makes a large sum of money off the sale of every cigarette. The cigarette companies receive justified criticism for profiting of the sale of a product that kills half of the people who use it—but exactly why is government less culpable when they too are making money off the sale of cigarettes?

Whether or not the benefits of smoking bans outweigh the increase risk and the additional cost is an open question. Even if they do, it’s still worth asking the question of just how much power we should be giving government to regulate our private affairs.

The RIAA And Lawsuit Abuse

A group of University of Maine legal clinic students are launching an assault on the RIAA’s demands that universities turn over the names of students accused of filesharing. They’ve filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against the RIAA in the case of Arista v. Does 1-27.

Rule 11 motions don’t often succeed, but the motion makes a strong case. There’s a federal law called the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(2)(B) (or “FERPA”) that’s analogous to the HIPPA regulations that prevent medical facilities from violating the privacy of patient records. What is happening is that the RIAA is demanding that colleges and universities turn over student records in violation of FERPA, and some of them have acquiesced. By demanding that colleges turn over confidential student information, the students are alleging that the RIAA is circumventing the rights of students under FERPA.

Rule 11 is designed to prevent litigants from suing for “any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). The students are alleging that the RIAA’s John Doe lawsuits are designed specifically to harass litigants into settling—and the record of hardball tactics used by the RIAA support that contention.

Also, the motion alleges that the purpose of the RIAA’s suits is to get the names of the students as an end run around FERPA. They site In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that a suit may only filed to uphold a legitimate legal right—you can’t sue someone just to get their name or to embarrass them (as was the case in Kunstler). This argument seems a bit weak. Rule 11 allows a suit to go forwards so long as that litigant has a good-faith argument that discovery will produce enough facts to justify the claim. Here, the RIAA can say that their suits were designed to produce legitimate information in discovery. However, there is an equally strong case that in fact, the purpose of the suits really was for the purpose of harassment—and in fact, some of the RIAA’s own statements in various filings seem to make precisely that argument. (One of which is cited in the motion for sanctions.)

Finally, the students argue that the RIAA is engaging in improper joinder of parties under Rule 20. Rule 20(b) concerns having a case in which a plaintiff (like the RIAA) tries to “join” multiple defendants (like the students) into a single lawsuit. In order to do that, the multiple defendants have to have engaged in “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”—just that they all engaged in filesharing isn’t enough. The RIAA has been slapped down several times by other courts for engaging in improper joinder of defendants before. That’s crucial because normally the remedy for improper joinder is just to split up the case—the students are arguing that since the RIAA keeps engaging in the same improper joinder they deserve sanctioning.

This is a very strong move on the part of the students, as Rule 11 sanctions are not something courts take likely. They make a very strong case that the RIAA’s conduct is worthy of sanction, especially if the court finds that the purpose of the RIAA’s suits is to get the names of students and then harass them into settling. In fact, that’s what the RIAA has done several times in the past.

If the purpose of the RIAA’s suits is not to actually sue the “John Doe” defendants but to pressure them into settling, then Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate. The sanctions regime under Rule 11 exists to prevent litigants from harassing others with “nuisance” lawsuits or using the threat of a suit purely for intimidation—and there’s much that suggests that’s precisely what the RIAA is doing. If the judge agrees, this would be a strong case for the imposition of sanctions, and it may be enough to prevent the RIAA from engaging in similar patterns of conduct in the future.

Medellin, International Law, And The Supreme Court

The SCOTUSblog has some interesting discussion of the recent Medellin v. Texas decision by the Supreme Court. The Bush Administration sought review of a Texas inmate’s death sentence after the Mexican government demanded that the government follow a decision by the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

The popular press is spinning the result as a defeat for the Bush Administration, which may be technically correct, but that misses the point. For one, it’s a defeat for Bush trying to put a stop to an execution in Texas, which seems a little out of character, and secondly the more important legal question has to do with how federal courts should interpret international law.

The International Court of Justice held in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 that the US had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by not informing 51 Mexican nationals in US jails of their rights under the Vienna Convention. The Court, in another case, found the opposite—that the Convention was not violated and that the states could use their own rules. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). The Bush Administration issued an executive order that told the states to uphold the ICJ’s Avena decision.

The Court, quite rightly, rejected this approach. Chief Justice Roberts’ decision makes it quite clear that unless Congress has said otherwise, ICJ cases like Avena do not have the force of federal law. In 1985, the United States exercised its rights under the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention and did not consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

This may seem a bit confusing, as individuals can’t opt out of laws in the United States, but these sorts of arrangements are common in international law. States can consent or not to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Vienna Convention, or they can also pick and choose what categories of cases it will choose to follow based on different treaties. Originally, the U.S. chose to submit to the ICJ on Vienna Convention claims, but in 2005 the U.S. opted out of those claims.

Chief Justice Roberts gets to the meat of the issue here:

No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.

The Court held that this was not such a case, and that unless Congress explicitly says that the Avena decision is also federal law, the Bush Administration can’t force the states to follow it.

What’s interesting about this case is how it’s vastly different from how we think of the Court operating. The “conservative” Justices voted against the Bush Administration, along with Justice Stevens. The “liberal” Justices voted to uphold the Bush Administration’s decision. It just goes to show how the whole “liberal/conservative” makeup of the Court really isn’t that accurate. Justice Scalia, the bête noir of liberal interest groups hammered the Bush Administration over detainee rights in Hamdan. In several criminal law cases, you find Justices Scalia and Ginsberg on the same page agreeing on the limitations on police discretion.

The Court is a lot more complex than people seem to think, and even a truly controversial case like Bush v. Gore is not as straightforward as people think. Cases like Medellin exhibit how our usual preconceptions of the Court don’t always match the reality. For as much as we talk about the politicization of the Supreme Court, the “conservative” Justices are hardly lapdogs for Republican Administrations, and the “liberal” justices are not always attack dogs either. The real question is how the individual Members of the Court interpret the law, and Medellin is a case where a strict construction of precedent goes against the Bush Administration and a “liberal” reading of federal law would support it.

What A Difference One Sentence Makes…

David Bernstein points to a case where a simple drafting error may have consequences in the billions:

JPMorgan and Bear were prompted to renegotiate after shareholders began threatening to block the deal and it emerged that several “mistakes” were included in the original, hastily written contract, according to people involved in the talks.

One sentence was “inadvertently included,” according to a person briefed on the talks, which requires JPMorgan to guarantee Bear’s trades even if shareholders voted down the deal. That provision could allow Bear’s shareholders to seek a higher bid while still forcing JPMorgan to honor its guarantee, these people said.

When the error was discovered, James Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, who was described by one participant as “apoplectic,” began calling his lawyers at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to seek a way to have the sentence modified, these people said. Finger pointing over the mistakes in the contracts began as bankers blamed the lawyers and vice versa.

Everyone in law, myself included, have been bitten by the occasional typo—in a profession that produces reams of paper a day, errors are an inevitability. At the same time, it’s shocking how many blatant errors can pop up in critical documents—one would think that a deal this large would have been scrutinized many times over before anything was signed.

It just goes to show that bad documents are frequently symptomatic of bad corporate cultures: they can be the product of a corporate culture that rushes to meet deadlines, or the product of a corporate culture that is so tribal that drafters of documents don’t feel comfortable sharing their work with others to get feedback.

There’s also a lesson for the legal education community here—business schools teach working in groups. Law schools don’t. Even though most law schools push the BigLaw career track, they still tend to teach students the skills needed to be sole practitioners. Fortunately this is changing, and while it’s harder to add group work to core courses like Property or Criminal Law, it makes a difference in courses like Contracts where one attorney probably shouldn’t be drafting a contract without at least one other attorney taking a look at it. That sort of socialization is even more important when something as small as one sentence, one word or even one punctuation mark can make a difference in the billions.

The Supreme Court Hears Second-Amendment Case

Tomorrow, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in District of Columbia v. Heller (07-290), a case which may see the Supreme Court determining whether or not the Second Amendment confers an individual right to own firearms.

The ScotusWiki has all the briefs and amici on the case. Unsurprisingly for a case of this importance, there are plenty of amicus briefs on both sides.

Ultimately, what this case may come down to is the appropriate standard of review. The Department of Justice concurs in the idea that the Second Amendment does give an individual right. However, the amicus brief for the United States argues that the standard of review should be less categorical than the one suggested by the Court of Appeals:

Although the court of appeals correctly held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, it did not apply the correct standard for evaluating respondent’s Second Amendment claim. Like other provisions
of the Constitution that secure individual rights, the Second Amendment’s protection of individual rights does not render all laws limiting gun ownership automatically invalid. To the contrary, the Second Amendment, properly construed, allows for reasonable regulation of firearms, must be interpreted in light of context and history, and is subject to important exceptions, such as the rule that convicted felons may be denied firearms because those persons have never been understood to be within the Amendment’s protections. Nothing in the Second Amendment properly understood—and certainly no principle necessary to decide this case—calls for invalidation of the numerous federal laws regulating firearms.

Reading the tea leaves, I think it’s quite possible that the Supreme Court will follow the argument of the United States in this case. A holding that the Second Amendment does confer an individual right to gun ownership, but that a restriction on that ownership must merely pass something like a rational basis test, seems a very likely outcome to me. This Court is a very conservative court—and I mean that in the dictionary rather than the political sense. Chief Justice Roberts does not seem inclined to upset the apple cart and sweep away a wide variety of state and federal statutes by having the Court issue a broad holding. Rather, it seems more likely that the Court will remand this case back to the Court of Appeals for rehearing based on a new set of criteria.

If that happens, it’s not going to be an outright win for anyone. The NRA and gun-owners groups will not be happy with a standard of review that’s likely to see most restrictions on gun ownership upheld. Anti-gun groups like the Brady Center are not going to be happy with the Court saying that the Constitution protects the rights of gun owners. Yet in terms of the law, it’s the best way for the Court to avoid making sweeping changes in policy one way or the other.

The Second Amendment does give individuals the right to own firearms. The history and intent of the Second Amendment is difficult to rationally interpret in any other way. I don’t see the Court being split on that issue. The real issue may be the standard of review, and if the amicus brief from the United States has as much weight with the Court that I suspect it will, my rough guess is that this decision will result in a remand to the Court of Appeals with an instruction to determine whether the District of Columbia’s gun regulations meets the appropriate standard of review. It could well be that the result of this process is a confirmation that the Second Amendment does protect an individual right, but that the D.C. gun laws don’t violate the standard of review. If so, this controversy isn’t going to be settled by this case, but will continue on for some time.

Spitzer’s Very Hot Water

Andrew McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor, takes a look at some of the possible criminal charges that could result from Gov. Eliot Spitzer (D-NY)’s prostitution scandal. Spitzer, who’s been one of the most crusading state AGs in recent years, is in some very hot water. He’s likely to face several federal racketeering charges, violations of the Mann Act and potentially money laundering charges as well.

Gov. Spitzer was known for being unwilling to compromise with the white-collar defendants he prosecuted in New York. He shouldn’t get any disparate treatment because of his position.