Jonah Goldberg notes in The Corner a great piece by Yossi Klein Halevi in The New Republic (which, alas, is not online) on the Israeli security fence:
The main objection to the fence, which is scheduled for completion in 2005, is that it doesn’t adhere to the pre-1967 green line but deviates “deep” into the West Bank. In fact, at most points, the fence either winds close to the green line or extends several miles over it without compromising Palestinian territorial contiguity–hardly the massive land grab warned against by opponents. So far, 108 miles of fence have been completed in the northwestern part of the West Bank, and about 1.5 percent of the West Bank has been incorporated into the Israeli side. If the fence is eventually extended to include Ariel–a town of 18,000 residents, which the Camp David negotiations included within the eventual borders of Israel–it will protrude, finger-shaped, about 15 miles into the territories. Yet even then the fence will encompass only a few percentage points of the West Bank. (The highest figure I’ve encountered is 10 percent.) And, note Israeli officials, the fence can be moved or even dismantled.
Still, that apologetic argument misses the point, which is that the fence must violate the green line. Building the fence on the 1967 border would play into the Palestinian strategy by creating the outlines of a de facto Palestinian state in all of the West Bank, without requiring the Palestinians to cease terrorism or genuinely recognize Israel. Building over the green line, by contrast, reminds Palestinians that every time they’ve rejected compromise–whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000–the potential map of Palestine shrinks. That message is the exact opposite of the left-wing trajectory of increased concessions under fire–from Camp David to Taba to Geneva. The fence is a warning: If Palestinians don’t stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them. Indeed, the fence is a reminder that the 1967 border isn’t sacrosanct. Legally, the West Bank is extraterritorial: The international community didn’t recognize Jordan’s annexation, and, because Palestine isn’t being restored but invented, its borders are negotiable.
The only justification for withdrawal to the green line is pragmatism. Most Israelis would accept an approximate withdrawal to the 1967 borders in exchange for genuine Palestinian acceptance of Jewish sovereignty on this land. Reinstating the green line, then, would be a reward for peace, not war. But what we’ve learned in the decade since Oslo began is that “land for peace” was never an option. At best, Israel was being offered land for a cease-fire. And that is hardly justification for returning to the precarious 1967 lines.
Sharon has stated that the fence is not a political border, and already sections are being pushed back as needed. However, the Israelis have the obligation to protect Israeli Arabs in the West Bank who want nothing to do with the Palestinians (as they know without Israel to attack, the PA will degenerate into factional civil war), as well as more mundane logistical concerns. The arguments against the wall also impose the mandate of providing protection for the Palestinians on Israel, which simply isn’t the case. It isn’t the business of Israel to protect an openly hostile state that has already engaged in acts of war against the Israeli people. The 1967 borders are barely defensible, and the 1967 armistice does not codify them into some inviolable law. If the Palestinians were willing to end violence, they could have had a state in 1937, 1947, or 2000, but they chose the path of violence. Arguing that Israel deserves blame for inflaming the Palestinians into violence is like arguing that a woman wearing a tight dress deserved to be raped for flaunting herself – it’s an argument that’s simply in bad taste and poor judgement.
