Assessing Iraq

Fareed Zakaria has a very soberminded and rational assessment of the situation in Iraq in The New Republic. Zakaria doesn’t engage in the political pissing matches that surround the war in Iraq but takes an objective look at the situation. He’s highly critical of Bush, but he doesn’t allow that criticism to influence his analysis. A selection:

I did not believe Saddam had a lethal arsenal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and I wrote as much in the months before the war (though, like everyone who is being honest, I am utterly astonished by what appears to be the lack of any weapons). But Saddam was an erratic, unpredictable leader who had been actively working against the United States and its interests–and peace in the region–for two decades. That meant he was a looming threat. Given the collapsing sanctions regime, at some point the United States would have to decide to move in one direction or the other. It could either welcome Saddam back into the community of nations and let him do what he would as a free agent. Or it could gather an international coalition to replace him. I wish that this latter policy had been pursued slowly and deliberately, with a genuine effort to forge a broad coalition and get the United Nations behind it. But, in the end, you have to decide whether to support the policy the president is pursuing–not the variation of it you wish he were pursuing. And I decided that, while timing and circumstances were not perfect, getting rid of one of the most ghastly regimes in the world, one that was a continued threat to U.S. interests, was worth supporting. Morality and realpolitik came together in the case against Saddam.

Zakaria argues that the Bush Administration made many key mistakes in the initial stages of the war, which is a fair assessment. Our failing to deal with places like Fallujah in a decisive manner still haunt us. Disbanding the Iraqi Army caused us many needless problems. The CPA was never that effective an organization, and we’ve squandered some of our legitimacy because of it. Abu Ghraib continues to haunt us, and to a point rightly so.

On the other hand, we’ve had some great successes. Moqtada al-Sadr has been sidelined, his ideology discredited, his movement gone from under him. While we failed in Fallujah, our success in the Shi’a south has been great. We’ve done well in preparing the Iraqis for sovereignty so far, and we’ve managed to keep the ethnic tensions in Iraq from boiling over into a massive revolt. So far the problems we’re having are not with the Iraqi people as a whole, but a few thousand terrorists.

The best successes we’ve had are the small ones that rarely get noticed. The rebuilding of schools. The personal relationships between commanders in the field and the Iraqi people. The countless ways in which our soldiers have given back to the Iraqis. These have all made things easier. While public opinion polls show a rising dislike of our troops, the situation on the ground in most areas seems to show more stability than the numbers do. Granted, the Iraqis don’t like being occupied, but once sovereignty is obtained and the Iraqi people begin truly fighting with our troops those feelings may well subside.

The UN did not want to help us in Iraq, and certainly we faced a choice between going it without the UN’s blessing or not going in at all. By Zakaria’s own reasoning, our choice was right. The UN ran away from Iraq after one (admittedly tragic) attack. The UN continues to stonewall on their complicity to the oil-for-food scandal. The UN has very little legitimacy in Iraq, and can offer very little help. However, the new resolution giving recognition to the the sovereignty of Iraq does give some benefit to the Iraqi people, giving them international recognition and legitimacy on the world stage. However, the argument that the UN would have been of any significant aid in easing the security situation seems unlikely to me. The terrorists in Somalia had no qualms about attacking UN peacekeepers, and it’s highly unlikely that Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi would either.

Zakaria also argues:

But, since we are listing mistakes, the biggest one many opponents of the war are making is to claim that Iraq is a total distraction from the war on terrorism. In fact, Iraq is central to that conflict. I don’t mean this in the deceptive and dishonest sense that many in the Bush administration have claimed. There is no connection between Saddam’s regime and the terrorists of September 11. But there is a deep connection between his regime and the terrorism of September 11. The root causes of Islamic terrorism lie in the dysfunctional politics of the Middle East, where failure and repression have produced fundamentalism and violence. Political Islam grew in stature as a mystical alternative to the wretched reality–secular dictatorships–that have dominated the Arab world. A new Iraq provides an opportunity to break this perverse cycle. The country is unlikely to become a liberal democracy any time soon. But it might turn out to be a pluralistic state that gives minorities limited protections, allows for some political participation, and has a reasonably open society. That would be a revolution in the Arab world.

I disagree with Zakaria’s assertion that there was no connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda, as does the September 11 Commission. However, he hits the nail right on the head when he identifies the importance of Iraq to the bigger picture. We’re not just fighting al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is a symptom of the larger disease that Zakaria identifies. Iraq is the best area to introduce the cure – a free market, religious tolerance, and some level of real democracy. Iraq doesn’t have to be Switzerland by next year, but if it becomes even nominally democratic it will have a major effect in the Arab world – which is exactly why the terrorists are so desperate to prevent that from happening.

Zakaria is one of the more level-headed writers on this war. He may be deeply critical of Bush, sometimes unfairly, but never gratuitously. He is an example of someone who understands what being a classical liberal is all about. He understands the war in Iraq, why it really took place, and what the costs and the benefits are. Indeed, his criticisms are made all the more powerful because one knows that they don’t come out of partisan axe-grinding. It is unfortunate that such voices of rationality and logical argumentation are few and far between.